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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper we investigate the foundations of forward guidance in the light of the theory of 
controllability in a strategic context. The announcement of future suitable policies can facilitate 
the control of the economic system by the policymaker, where the term ‘control’ is used in the 
sense of the ‘classical’ theory of economic policy developed by Tinbergen (1952) and others 
and recently revived in a strategic context. In this context the contribution of forward guidance to 
controllability has been recognized. However, existing studies have not indicated either the 
ways through which the different types of announcement can have this effect or the necessary 
conditions for that. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper we investigate the foundations of forward guidance in the light of the 
theory of controllability in a strategic context. The announcement of future suitable 
policies can facilitate the control of the economic system by the policymaker, 
where the term ‘control’ is used in the sense of the ‘classical’ theory of economic 
policy developed by Tinbergen (1952)
2
 and others and recently revived in a 
strategic context, by, e.g., Acocella, Di Bartolomeo, Hughes Hallett (2012). This 
has been shown by Acocella, Di Bartolomeo, Hughes Hallett (2012), which, 
however, does not specify the contribution of the different types of forward 
guidance to controllability. We aim at indicating the ways through which an 
announcement can have this effect and the necessary conditions for that.  
In the next section we illustrate the different notions of controllability. In section 3 
we list the various types of forward guidance (fg). Section 4 illustrates the 
information available to the agents in a model with exogenous rational 
expectations and to players in a strategic game. Section 5 tends to qualify how the 
specific information provided by the different types of forward guidance can 
facilitate controllability, by adding to the information already available to the 
                                                          
1
 The paper benefitted from discussions with Giovanni Di Bartolomeo. Some parts of the various 
sections draw on Acocella, Di Bartolomeo, Hughes Hallett (2012), Part IV. 
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 A complete presentation of the theory, also in its dynamic form we are interested in, can be 
found in Preston, Pagan (1982) and Hughes Hallett, Rees (1983). 
 3 
 
private sector having rational expectation or in a Stackelberg game. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
 
2. THE NOTIONS OF CONTROLLABILITY 
 
We refer to a dynamic policy problem where the private sector has rational 
expectations. We state the problem in rather general terms. For some uses we will 
change some of the assumptions of the problem as indicated here, mainly with 
reference to uncertainty.  
The economy is described by the following difference equation, which includes 
the policy rule followed by the policymaker
3
, as will be clear from the example 
below:  
 
(1) 1 1|t t t t t ty Ay Bu Cy v        
for t = 1…T, given values for y0 and yT ,  
 
where RSy  is the vector of the states of the system, which are the 
policymaker’s target variables,  1| 1 |t t t ty E y    denotes the mathematical 
expectation of 1ty   conditional on t  (the common information set available to all 
the agents at t) and tu  is the vector of control variables in the hands of the 
policymaker. Matrices A, B and C are constant and of order S, S m, and S, 
respectively, and have at least some nonzero elements. In this representation, y0 
is a known initial condition, and yT+1 is some known, assumed or expected, 
terminal condition which is part of the information set t. Finally tv  is a vector of 
exogenous shocks or other influences on ,ty which has a known mean but comes 
from an unspecified probability distribution.
 
                                                          
3
 As is clear from the literature, such rule may differ from those deriving from optimization of the 
preference function of the monetary authority under the constraint of the model of the 
economy. This is also true for the Taylor rule, which can however be interpreted as a simple 
way of capturing the rule derived from minimization of the central bank’s loss function 
(according to Woodford, 2001: 19, ‘the Taylor rule incorporates several features of an optimal 
monetary policy, from the standpoint of at least one simple class of optimizing models’). Taylor 
rules are also used to cross-check optimal policy rule, because of their robustness to imperfect 
knowledge of the model of the economy (e.g., Tillmann 2011; Bursian, Roth. 2013). 
Alternatively, instead of the policy rule we could add to the model the first-order condition of 
the central bank’s loss function derived by minimizing this under the constraint of the model of 
the remaining part of the economy. In our case, by assuming that the central bank is 
interested in all the variables of the reduced form system, we could minimize  
(2)    
1
T
t t t t t
t
L E y y Q y y

   ,  
where RSy   is its vector of desired target values, and Q  is a full rank matrix of assigned 
weights.  

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The final form model can be written as: 
 
(3) 
1|1 1|1 1|111 1
|1 |1 |11
. . .
. . .. . .
. . .. . .
. . .. . .
. . .
T
T T TT TT
y u bR R
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      
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      
      
            
, or   y Ru b   
 
where 
1( ),TR T I B
       1 1 0 1|1( | ) : 0 0 :T Tb T E v A y C y      , 
denotes the Kronecker product and 
TT is the Toeplitz matrix in (4), i.e.: 
(4) 
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 . 
 
There are different notions of controllability in a dynamic setting: 
1) Static controllability: policy instruments have the ability to reach any 
specified set of target values, from an arbitrary initial position, in expectation, 
within a single decision period. 
2) Multi-period static controllability: policy instruments have the capability to 
reach any specified sequence of desired target values (from an arbitrary initial 
position), in expectation, at every point within an interval containing an arbitrary 
number of consecutive decision periods. 
3) Dynamic controllability: policy instruments have the ability to achieve an 
arbitrary set of target values, in expectation, at a single point a certain number of 
periods in the future, given an arbitrary starting point and without concern for what 
values those targets or other variables might take along the way or after the target 
values have been achieved. 
4) Path controllability: policy instruments have the ability to achieve an 
arbitrary set of target values a given number of decision periods after an arbitrary 
start; and then either hold those values or follow some pre-specified path of target 
values, again in expectation, at each decision point for an arbitrary period of time 
thereafter. 
Given S and m, these concepts of controllability define the capacity to reach the 
desired targets over an interval of length T, i.e. [t0, t0+T], starting the policy actions 
in period t0–P:  
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1. Static controllability:     P = 0  T = 0. 
2. Multi-period static controllability:   P = 0  T > 0. 
3. Dynamic controllability:    P > 0  T = 0.  
4. Path controllability:     P > 0  T > 0. 
4
 
We are specifically interested in static and dynamic controllability. In more 
formal terms, an economy (model) is said to be dynamically controllable if a 
sequence of instrument values 1,............, tu u  can be found that will reach any 
arbitrary values, 
ty , for the target variables in period t (at least in expectation) 
given an arbitrary starting point
0.y  In this case, differently from the case of static 
controllability, we are not concerned with the period-by-period controllability of the 
target variables between periods 1 and t–1. Starting from period 1, dynamic 
controllability therefore requires a sequence of intended instrument values, 
1|1 |1,....., Tu u  say, that guarantee |1ty is reached in period t=T. This is possible only if 
the sequence of policy multipliers and anticipatory effects in the t-th row block of 
(3), i.e. [ ,1 ,.....t t TR R ], is of full rank ( ,1 ,r[ .... ]t t TR R S ), given an arbitrary initial state 0y  
and a specified terminal condition 1|1Ty  (Acocella, Di Bartolomeo, Hughes Hallett, 
2012). 
 
 
3. TYPES OF FORWARD GUIDANCE  
 
Fg has been introduced as an innovative way of dealing with a situation of limited 
effectiveness of monetary policy action, especially in proximity of the zero-bound 
level of interest rates (Woodford, 2013). There are 3 types of fg: ‘open-ended’; 
‘time-contingent’ or ‘calendar-date’ or ‘date-based’; ‘conditional’ or ‘threshold’ 
(CESifo, 2013; Plosser, 2013). They have been introduced by monetary 
authorities, but could also be used by other policymakers..   
The first type of fgis a very loose one, as it indicates that the current stance will 
continue for an indefinite time period. This form of fg was implemented by the 
Federal Reserve in August 2003 and again in December 2008 and by the ECB in 
July 2013. The second type of fg was introduced by the Bank of Canada and the 
Swedish Riksbank in April 2009, by the Federal Reserve in August 2011. It 
announces that the central bank will implement a given (in our case, an 
accommodative) action for a certain period of time, possibly with a proviso 
referred to the evolution of some relevant variables (e.g., inflation keeping at 
moderate values) (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2011)
5
. 
                                                          
4
 More on the meaning, conditions for, and implications of, the various concepts of controllability 
in a dynamic setting can be found in Acocella, Di Bartolomeo, Hughes Hallett (2012). 
5
 Krugman (1999) and Eggerston, Woodford (2003) had suggested to credibly promise a given 
expansionary stance for even longer than required by the economic situation. This suggestion 
was followed by the Fed during the 2003-05 crisis, but was then blamed it for nourishing the 
housing bubble, even if adherence to the promise was due to the desire to maintain credibility 
(Gurkaynak, 2012). The initial suggestion has been replicated by Woodford (2013). We will be 
more specific on the exact content of history-dependent rules below.  
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Conditional fg – to which the Federal Reserve shifted in December 2012 and that 
has been adopted by the Bank of England too in August 2013 - indicates the 
conditions of the economy (in terms of the values of some relevant policy targets) 
to which a certain policy is tied. The policymaker can announce its policy target 
values – the Fed indicated an unemployment rate of 6.5% and an inflation rate of 
2.5% –but no policymaker has hitherto announced a precise policy rule, i.e. not 
only target values, but also marginal rates of substitution between targets or even 
a ‘history-dependent’ rule of the kind advocated by Eggertsson, Woodford (2003). 
Such rules can be thought to be a kind of commitment more than an 
announcement.  
Fg acts on expectations in substance. Low nominal interest rates expected for 
some period can stimulate investment and possibly consumption. If the current 
nominal interest rate is near zero, an expected higher inflation rate – e.g. as a 
consequence of an announcement (or commitment) of the kind suggested by a 
history-dependent rule – can not only help keeping expectations of the real rate 
low but also push expected real interest rates to the negative.  
Given the vagueness of the period of ‘validity’ of the promise, the first type of fg 
is not considered to be particularly effective. In fact, markets did not show specific 
reactions to similar announcements. However, this does not rule out the possibility 
that they had some degree of effectiveness, as we do not know the possible 
alternative conduct of the market. The most effective types of fg are the ‘time-
contingent’ and ‘conditional’ ones.  
A first shortcoming of the former is that it might be interpreted either as a 
credible promise or as the expected policy if the policymaker has made correct 
predictions on the duration of the sluggish change in the level of real variables and 
low inflation. This ambiguity derives from the fact that time-contingent fg does not 
explicitly indicate the value of targets a given course of policy action is tied to. To 
be a credible promise this action should be prosecuted also in the case when 
either exogenous shocks or the endogenous evolution of the system or both 
improve the situation in an unpredicted way
6
. But this could imply a suboptimal 
solution and thus be time inconsistent. Because of this, according to some 
economists, time-contingent fg has more of the nature of a Delphic prophecy and 
is perceived as such by the market (Meyer, 2012). It can however still reduce 
private sector’s uncertainty (Campbell et al 2012: 2). One reason of effectiveness 
has to do with the fact that the fear of time inconsistency can be counterbalanced 
by the possibility that markets interpret the promise to keep interest rates low even 
beyond the time when monetary authorities’ target values have been reached as 
an intentional and credible move to create expectations of a relatively high 
                                                          
6
 In principle, also the opposite case should be considered, i.e. the economy’s situation can 
deteriorate in such a way as to ask for a stronger accommodative action. However, when the 
policy stance has already hit the zero-level-boundary, only enactment of other policy actions 
could deal with the new situation. 
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inflation and very low or negative real rates (Eggertsson, Woodford, 2003)
 7
 This 
would impart a more powerful incentive to aggregate demand. 
Conditional forward guidance has the advantage of being more flexible while 
indicating values of targets that, at least when the current and the prospective 
evolution of the economy is far from satisfying them,  resembles more an 
Odyssean commitment, thus potentially changing public expectations (Campbell 
et al 2012, 3)
8
. In fact, it specifies at least some parameters of the policy rule 
followed by the central bank, i.e. of the relationship between the central bank’s 
instrument and its targets. Fed’s announcement of 2012 concentrated on a couple 
of points (Plosser, 2013), which may be thought as a sufficient condition for 
successful guidance under the conditions indicated above. If, instead of an 
announcement about the rule, a time-contingent or conditional one is made, the 
private sector could ‘learn’ about the expected policy rule by taking into account 
and comparing a number of indicators, such as the projections of some relevant 
variables (e.g., interest rates, inflation rates) by the policymaker, its actual 
behavior and the evolution of economy. 
Consider that conditional fg can be amended in a way that leads to an even 
more effective and credible promise, if some target, e.g. the inflation target, for the 
next periods is made history-dependent, by taking account of both the current 
evolution of the relevant targets and their target levels, as suggested by 
Eggertsson, Woodford (2003) and Woodford (2013). In the case of monetary 
policy, a history-dependent announcement (or commitment) consists in some rule 
specifying a policy that should result in higher inflation expectations when the 
interest rate is bounded to a zero level boundary.  
In the next two sections we try to disentangle the different kind of information 
available to the private sector with fg from that can be reasonably assumed to be 
available to players in a strategic game. We specifically refer to conditional fg, but 
can also refer to the information provided by open-ended fg and time-contingent 
fg, which serve also as a term of comparison.  
An issue that must be tackled refers to the difference between fg and 
commitment
9
. The former is a kind of announcement (cheap talk) and differs from 
the latter as it simply conveys information about future policy decisions, the 
inflation target value, etc. The policymaker communicates information concerning 
its future conduct that, differently from commitment (a binding message), does not 
tie its hands to a unique course of action, but leaves it some freedom under 
certain contingencies. That said, one must consider that there is a continuum 
between discretion and commitment, as first clarified by Chari, Kehoe, Prescott 
(1989) and reminded by Ridley (2012). In addition, perfect commitment can only 
be possible for a Ramsey policymaker with complete authority, infinite life, perfect 
                                                          
7
 However, this does not mean that Eggertsson, Woodford suggest adoption of a purely date-
based type of fg, as Woodford (2013) confirms. Their proposal is of a history-dependent rule, 
as we will shortly see. 
8
 Similar kinds of fg were suggested by Evans (2011, 2012) and Romer (2011). 
9
 Confusion on this distinction has occurred among many central bankers and economists 
(Blinder, 2009: 4).  
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communication and complete credibility (Levin, 2012). To be effective, however, fg 
must have a high degree of credibility, which means that the policymaker has no 
incentive to deviate from the announced action, unless under exceptional 
circumstances. This gives an incentive to the private sector to behave in the 
desired way. Then both parts tend to prefer this course of action to others. Perfect 
commitment to some action would guarantee that this action will be chosen in any 
case, i.e. whatever external shock may hit the economy and even if this is sub-
optimal for the policymaker. If the economic situation and the foreseeable future 
are such that these circumstance and reasons for not complying to it appear to be 
as exceptional, fg can be effective even if it does not imply a (perfect) 
commitment. To this end it might not cover all the determinants of its conduct, but 
only a part of them. Considering all these features of a (perfect) commitment, it is 
really difficult to find a similar case of engagement taken by a policymaker in 
practice. Then we leave it open the issue of the true nature of a history-dependent 
rule.  
 
 
4. INFORMATION AVAILABLE WITH RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS AND IN STRATEGIC GAMES  
 
To begin, let us discuss in this section the kind of information that is supposed to 
be available to agents with rational expectations or to players in a strategic game. 
The case where there is a single policymaker and the private sector is assumed to 
have rational expectations is equivalent to a Stackelberg game with the private 
sector as the leader and the policymaker as the follower. Each player is assumed 
to know either the model of the economy and the strategy chosen by his 
opponent, in the case of a Stackelberg follower, or the model of the economy and 
his opponent’s reaction function, in the case of a Stackelberg leader or of players 
playing Nash. To be sure, the reaction function is apparently different from the rule 
adopted by the  central bank to respond to the values taken by the variables 
relevant to it as a consequence of the evolution of the economy, i.e. from the rule 
it follows in setting its instruments in response to gaps between the current values 
of the target variables and its target values. However, this rule is equivalent to the 
leader’s quasi-reaction function, i.e. a quasi-best response function in terms of 
targets, rather than instruments,
10
 as the latter can be derived from the former, up 
to a constant. 
For simplicity let us refer to the case when the private sector has rational 
expectation. In this case the private sector knows the economy’s model (1), 
including the policy rules, exploits all the information available at time t0 and 
correctly forecasts the expected value of the relevant variables of the model. If the 
problem is dealt with in terms of a Stackelberg game, it is assumed that the 
private sector knows the economy’s model and the reaction function of the central 
bank. As said, the latter is equivalent to a quasi-reaction function obtained – in a 
way similar, but not identical to the reaction function – by minimizing the central 
                                                          
10
 For a formal definition of these see Acocella, Di Bartolomeo, Hughes Hallett (2012: 104).  
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bank’s loss function under the constraint of the model. The private sector knows 
both its target values and the marginal rates of substitution among them. In 
addition, both the private sector and the policymaker know the model of the 
economy. Let us assume that they share the same model of the economy. Both 
agents then share the same information set. 
Under the assumptions of perfect certainty, symmetric information about the 
model of the economy (including the current and future policymaker’s payoff) as 
well as rational expectations
11
, fg can add no information to that available to the 
private agent. With these (absolutely unrealistic, but useful as a term of 
comparison) assumptions, the model presented above, in which tv = 0, holds. In 
this case, even if the policymaker has more than one target but only one 
instrument, it should have full static controllability of the economy in a dynamic 
setting. In fact, when T ≥ S and  t < T, but the horizon is long enough to fulfil the 
rank condition ,1 ,r[ .... ]t t SR R S , dynamic controllability should be ensured even 
without forward looking expectations. Rational expectations accelerate the 
possibility for the policymaker to control the economy from any date, as the private 
sector anticipates the future behavior of the policymaker and knows that the latter 
can control the economy.  
Let us now depart from the assumption of perfect certainty, retaining the other 
assumptions. We initially assume that there may be additive shocks to the 
economy, i.e. tv  ≠ 0, again, as in (1). This makes the expected future reaction of 
the policymaker uncertain. Were its preference function known with certainty, it 
would be possible to derive its reaction function and decisions. Its future policies 
would be uncertain, simply because shocks to the economy may occur, but the 
assumption of rational expectation would ensure knowledge of the expected 
reaction to them. Again, no announcement could be informative in these 
conditions. In order for an announcement to add information to that already 
available to the private sector, one must add uncertainty (or absolute ignorance) 
of the policymaker’s future preferences. Announcements can make public action 
(more) effective either as they can add information on future expected decisions 
or as they inform about (parts of) the loss function itself. While open-ended and 
time-contingent fg are announcements adding information about actions, 
conditional fg communicates information referred directly to the preference 
function. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 If this can have any role at all in a model with certainty. Rational expectations could be 
intended in their ‘weak’ forma, as model-consistent expectations (see Snowdon, Vane, 
Wynarczyk, 1994), an assumption that is equivalent to that of knowledge of the model by both 
agents. 
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5. INFORMATION ADDED BY FORWARD GUIDANCE WITH RE AND ITS ROLE IN FACILITATING SYSTEM’S 
CONTROLLABILITY  
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
In order to see now whether, when and how fg can add to the information already 
available to the private sector having rational expectations, as indicated in section 
4, we must move outside the model of perfect certainty or of additive uncertainty 
as to the model. We will retain or not the other assumptions introduced there.  
We show that the nature of information and the degree of confidence in it is 
different for the different types of fg, due to the different nature of uncertainty 
‘covered’ by different announcements. As a consequence, the impact on 
controllability differs. In reality, uncertainty is widespread as it can first refer to the 
model’s correspondence to reality, in relation to the possible occurrence of shocks 
(and for this it is common to both the private sector and the policymaker). In 
addition, it can involve the policymaker’s preference function (and in this case it is, 
at least as a first approximation, asymmetric
12
) and, as a consequence, the policy 
rule it follows or the expected value of the instruments at future dates. We will see 
that some types of fg are promises, with different degrees of credibility and a 
different ‘coverage’ of uncertainty.  
 
 
5.2 The additional information provided by open-ended forward guidance 
 
We will assume, until different statements are made, that the model is (additively) 
uncertain, the preferences of the policymakers are unknown. Without loss of 
generality, we further assume that  m = 1 < S  for our policymaker and that T ≥ S.  
In general, fg implies an addition of promised expected values to the set of 
instruments to be chosen by the policymaker’s for t > 1. In fact, as said in section 
2, by open-ended fg the policymaker announces that the current stance will last 
for an indefinite period of time. There is no certain promise for the future policies, t 
> 1 onwards. This implies that elements of ( 2|1 |1,..., Tu u )’ in (3) have different and 
possibly highly subjective degrees of likelihood. The fact that continuation of the 
current policy is uncertain – and decreasingly probable with the elapsing of time – 
makes it clear why this kind of fg can have a beneficial role, but is not very 
effective.  
That said, different types of uncertainty (or ignorance) about the policymaker’s 
preferences may reduce or widen the benefits accruing from the announcement. 
Ignorance of the nature and of the precise number of targets and target values 
pursued by the policymaker and the marginal rates of substitution between the 
                                                          
12
 In a dynamic setting ignorance or uncertainty about the policymaker’s future preferences can 
also affect the policymaker itself, e.g., for reasons related to the future composition of the 
ruling committees. This would be a very difficult case to deal with in analytical terms and we 
will largely rule it out of our study.  
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targets would add to ineffectiveness. By contrast, if the private sector knew even 
simply the number of targets (as a result of general information about the 
policymaker’s ‘mission’ or as an effect of other announcements), we could say 
that ineffectiveness would be lower, the lower the number of targets S pursued by 
the policymaker and the higher the number of policy instruments. A high 
targets/instruments ratio could add to credibility of the promise. To some extent 
the credibility of the announcement would also depend on the reputation of the 
policymaker and the distance between the current and the expected future states 
of the economy.  
This kind of fg can give no assurance about not only shocks, but also changes in 
the policy targets. 
 
 
5.3. The additional information provided by time-contingent forward guidance 
 
As said in section 2, time contingent fg avoids uncertainty as to the timing of exit 
policies. If the private sector knows the number of targets (as we assumed in the 
previous sub-section), maintenance of the current policy is guaranteed with 
certainty (or reasonable certainty) for a certain length of time, which enhances 
policy effectiveness. In this case we can say that clarification of the horizon of 
current policy can help to bridge the gap between the number of instruments and 
that of targets. Obviously, the possibility to control the system depends on both 
the duration of the policy (let us call it t*, including the current period) and the time 
horizon of the private sector. If the latter is much longer than the former, the 
effectiveness of the policy is scarce and the dynamic controllability of the system 
is hardly ensured. Effectiveness is also lower the higher the number of targets S 
pursued by the policymaker and the lower the number of policy instruments. 
Let us assume that time-contingent fg offers information for 2 periods, in addition 
to the current one, which implies that t*= 3. If the policymaker has a reputation for 
sticking to its announcements, information about the policy stance at time t = 3 is 
as reliable as that for time t = 2, etc. More generally, if t*= T, elements of (
2|1 |1,..., Tu u )’ in (3) are all known with reasonable certainty, which makes the 
system statically controllable from t=1, even if the policymaker has only one 
instrument and the number of its targets is S = T.  
A problem might derive from the fact that, due to possible shocks, this type of fg 
may result suboptimal after the period when targets are hit. This could give an 
incentive to the policymaker not to implement the announced policy, after reaching 
its target, thus creating an issue of time inconsistency and reducing its credibility. 
If expected shocks (as for, e.g., expected growth abroad) are low, at least for 
some periods, the risk of sub-optimality of the announced policies is low or 
practically nil. But even in the case when this risk is apparently significantly 
different from zero, the announced policy can indeed be optimal for two reasons.  
One has to do with the fact that the private sector can trust the announced 
policy: even if this were suboptimal, private agents  can in fact intend the possible 
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cost to the policymaker of sticking to the announced policy as a the typical cost 
necessary for commitment, thus making the announcement credible.  
But there is another reason why the announced policy can be optimal even if the 
horizon to which the announcement refers is beyond the date at which the 
policymaker expects its targets to be reached. This has to do with the reasoning 
underlying the suggestion of a history-dependent kind of fg by Eggertsson, 
Woodford (2003). As seen before, this kind of fg is different from a time-contingent 
(‘fixed-date’ in their terms) announcement. In fact, in this sub-section we consider 
a promise of future policies, independently of both future conditions and the 
distance between current and future conditions from the target value. In this type 
of fg target values are even not mentioned by the policymaker, which only 
announces future policies. However, even if the type of fg we are dealing with is 
different from that suggested by Eggertsson, Woodford, a reasoning similar to that 
involved in the optimality of the latter (specifically, by keeping expectations of 
inflation high even beyond its target value) may positively influence the private 
sector and add to the effectiveness of time-contingent fg. This type of fg does not 
indicate any target value, but the very prospect of the possibility for the policy to 
be continued even after this unknown target value is reached can increase 
expectations of an increasing inflation rate and thus of a negative real interest 
rate. 
This type of fg does not cover uncertainty about changes of either policy targets 
or parameters (or both) of the policymaker’s loss function. 
 
 
5.4. The additional information provided by conditional forward guidance 
 
In the previous two sub-sections we have assumed that the model is uncertain 
(because of additive shocks), while the policymaker’s payoff is unknown. The 
indication of at least some parameters of the rule that will be followed by the 
central bank (more generally, by the policymaker) – instead of future decisions – 
adds knowledge useful for making it easier to control the economy. Let us refer 
more specifically to the exact Fed’s announcement of this kind of fg. In July 2013 
President Bernanke, in confirming the December 2012 decision of the FMOC, 
made it clear before the Congress that, first, no exit policy would be adopted ‘at 
least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6.5 per cent and inflation 
and inflation expectations remain well behaved in the sense described in the 
FOMC's statement’ (implying that long-term inflation is below 2 per cent). In 
addition, ‘the specific numbers for unemployment and inflation in the guidance are 
thresholds, not triggers. Reaching one of the thresholds would not automatically 
result in an increase in the Federal funds rate target’ (Bernanke, 2013). 
In this case the Fed President not only indicated, in the first part of his 
statement, the target values of the central bank’s loss function (and, obviously, the 
type of targets pursued), but also made a partial step towards the kind of fg (or 
commitment) suggested by Krugman (1998) and Eggertsson, Woodford (2003). 
Let us refer briefly to the first part. Comparison of the target values of the Fed with 
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reality (remember that the unemployment rate in the US had been stagnating 
around 8% for the whole year 2012, with only a negligible reduction, thus well 
above the Fed’s target value) could boost investment. As to the second part, the 
monthly inflation rate average since May 2012 had been 1.7-1.8%, comfortably 
below 2%, but with highs of 2.0-2.2% in a couple of months. The Fed was thus 
delivering a clear message that the current stance would be likely to continue also 
after reaching one of the target values. In particular, hitting the inflation target 
value would not necessarily imply a halt to the expansionary policy, as (and until 
when) the other target had not been hit. The whole announcement can be 
understood as a step towards Eggertsson and Woodford’s proposal. For our 
purposes
13
 we can interpret this as due to the fact that, even if Bernanke’s 
announcement referred to target values only, and did not include the marginal 
rates of substitution of Fed’s loss function, there was a clear indication that 
substitutability between the two targets might make the central bank not to initiate 
a policy contraction even if inflation is above its target value. All in all, instead of 
announcing continuation of the current policy for a given period – as in the time-
contingent case – the policymaker practically promises to continue the current 
policy for the whole period necessary to hit both targets, or at least to have a 
satisfactory mix of them. This kind of announcement is likely to be informative for 
the private sector.  
The central bank could give a different and more complete form of conditional fg 
announcement, by indicating the Taylor rule it follows. In this case it would also 
announce the rates of substitution among its targets. If we stick to the usual 
rational expectation assumption, this information should be enough to deduct the 
same implications as Eggertsson, Woodford’s (2003). Communicating the Taylor 
rule would in practice be a kind of (soft) commitment, the possibility still being 
open of a change in the parameters of the Taylor rule (as well in the very nature of 
targets) favoured by monetary authorities, following the insurgence of new 
unexpected needs or, in any case, a change in the orientation of the persons in 
charge with the monetary policy. This would introduce the assumption of another 
kind of uncertainty, as uncertainty about the marginal rates of substitution is 
multiplicative, not additive. 
In the two types of fg we have dealt with in the two previous subsections, 
uncertainty or ignorance remained about the policymaker’ preferences, as the 
promise referred to the actions, leaving their determinants relatively uncertain or 
obscure. Given that this uncertainty is not removed, at least partially, by the policy 
announcement, the only way to indirectly indicate future preferences is a promise 
of future policies. Instead, conditional fg (partially) removes uncertainty as to the 
preference function, thus trying to offer indications about the source of future 
policies to the private sector. The prospect is still uncertain in so far as uncertainty 
about the model survives, some specific parameters of the policymaker’s 
                                                          
13
 We are reasoning not in terms of commitment, as Eggertsson, Woodford’s (2003) proposal 
can be interpreted to do, but of announcements as purely adding information to the system. 
Obviously, however, this involves some credibility argument. We have, in fact, already said 
that the difference between fg and commitment may become very thin. 
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preference function may be unknown or, in any case, are open to possible future 
changes. However, the degree of confidence of the private sector should increase 
with this type of fg. Open-ended and time-contingent fg could improve policy 
effectiveness in so far as they give some kind of assurance about invariance of 
policy with respect to shocks affecting the economy. Uncertainty about the 
policymaker’s loss function is the focus of conditional fg. At least to some extent, 
eliminating or reducing this source of uncertainty can be thought of as giving a 
larger ‘coverage’ to the effects of the announcement and a more credible way of 
announcing future policies, at least in so far as possible external shocks are 
thought to be unlikely to bridge gaps between announced and current values of 
policy targets.  
According to some economists, this type of fg could be intended as a true 
commitment policy. However, this is not the case for a number of reasons. First, 
because, at least in the version hitherto implemented, this type of fg does not 
cover the policymaker’s marginal rates of substitution among its targets. This 
could negatively affect its effectiveness when the economy is close to target 
values or has hit some of them.  Moreover, as Blinder (2012) noticed, there might 
be more than a single, invariant Taylor rule, since new targets may emerge in 
addition to the standard ones (Romer, 2012). Finally, policy orientations might 
change through time, which would have very different implications in terms of 
interest rates. This has certainly been the case for the Fed in the past. 
In more formal terms, conditional fg announcements would add, e.g., for the 
private sector, information of the following kind to that already available as a 
consequence of the assumption of knowledge of the model: 
(6) 
_
( , )t t tu g y y ,  
 
where we have indicated also target values, as relevant information. 
The details of this relation may however be different. In any case the private 
sector can be informed about the policymaker’s target values and, possibly, also 
its marginal rates of substitution among the targets. 
Were the policymaker a central bank, complete conditional fg announcements 
would take the form of announcing the Taylor rule it complies to, and equation (6) 
could take a form like the following one: 
 
(7) 
_
( ) ( )t t t t t y t ti r a a y y  
        
 
where it  is the bank’s policy tool (usually the short-term nominal interest rate; e.g. 
the Federal funds rate in the US), t  is the rate of inflation, * is the desired rate 
of inflation,  rt* is the assumed equilibrium real interest rate, yt is the logarithm of 
real GDP, and 
_
y is the logarithm of potential output. 
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This would offer information about the bank’s targets, its target values and the 
marginal rate of substitution between inflation and income (or unemployment). In 
the case of the Federal Reserve in December 2012, only
 
*
 
and
 
_
y  were 
announced, not the rate of substitution between output (or unemployment) and 
inflation.  
 
 
5.5. Some considerations common to the different types of fg 
 
First, we summarize the results of our analysis so far, by stating the pros and cons 
of the various cases of fg for system controllability in the following table: 
We must now clarify some methodological aspects of our investigation. We have 
seen that fg can have no effect under the strict assumptions of the basic model 
listed at the beginning of section 5.1. This implies that, in order to explain its 
effectiveness, some additional degree of realism must be added to the model, by 
removing some of those assumptions. This is certainly so for perfect certainty, 
which we have replaced with additive uncertainty in the model and ignorance 
about the loss function, whose knowledge is substituted by announcements of the 
future values of policy instruments or of parts of the loss function. In the case of 
conditional fg, partial knowledge of the loss function is introduced but marginal 
rates of substitution are left unknown (in the experience so far), which implies a 
kind of multiplicative uncertainty. The form of conditional fg used by the Fed in 
2012, in fact removed only uncertainty about target values in the policymaker’s 
loss function. Announcing the policy rule would add information as to the marginal 
rates of substitution, leaving only uncertainty as to future changes of the loss 
function.  
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Table 1: The pros and cons of forward guidance for system controllability  
 
Cases of fg 
 
 
Pros  
 
Cons  
Any type of fg in 
the basic model 
with certainty (see 
sect. 5.1. for other 
assumptions) 
None  None  
Open-ended fg 1. Higher effect in the 
short run, with high 
reputation, high m, low S, 
low expected changes of 
the economy 
1. low effect in the long run, 
with low reputation, etc. 
2. private sector ignores 
targets, target values and mrs  
Time-contingent fg 1. Higher effect for high 
t*, high reputation and high 
m, low S, low time horizon 
of the private sector, low 
expected changes of the 
economy 
2. high credibility if 
announcement is 
interpreted as a 
commitment 
3. lasting policy as a way 
to stimulate expansion at 
the ZLB 
1. Possibility that the 
announced policy is sub-
optimal at some future t 
 
Conditional fg 1.Covers (partial or total) 
ignorance of the loss 
function 
1.Partial assurance in case 
of shocks to the economy 
2. No info (until now) about 
the mrs  
3. No coverage for changes 
in the arguments and 
parameters of L or the policy 
rule  
 
This repetition is in order to stress that, together with certainty of the model 
and/or the policymaker’s preference function, another assumption has been 
removed throughout subsections 5.2 to 5.4 in order to assess the effectiveness of 
fg. In fact, symmetric information about the policymaker’s payoff no longer 
survives there, unless the whole policy rule is made known to the private sector, 
which is what happens under the most informative kind of conditional fg. Other 
assumptions, i.e. that of rational expectations (at least in so far as the solution of 
the model once the policy rule is known) and symmetric knowledge of the model 
of the economy, are retained. Removing one of these assumptions would require 
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adding some kind of learning in order to assess the possible benefits of fg. One 
could start by assuming that policymaker’s knowledge is certain while the private 
sector’s is not and try to see how fg can help the private sector to learn it. 
Learning would also be useful, at least to some extent, in the case where all or 
some of the parameters of the policy rule are unknown. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We have shown that forward guidance adds information to the private sector that 
can enhance effectiveness of policy, in way and to an extent that depends on the 
type of information provided by each specific type of announcement. In fact, this 
can ensure dynamic or even static controllability in a dynamic context. 
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